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A B S T R A C T
Schistosomiasis is a serious health problem in many parts of Africa which is linked to poor water quality and
limited sanitation resources. We administered a discrete choice experiment on water access and health education
in rural Uganda, focussing on interventions designed to reduce cases of the disease. Unlike previous studies, we
included a payment vehicle of both labour hours supplied per week and money paid per month within each
choice set. We were thus able to elicit both willingness to pay and willingness to work for alternative inter-
ventions. Respondents exhibit high demand for new water sources. From the random parameter model, only
households with knowledge about water-borne parasites are price sensitive and exhibit willingness to pay values.
Through a latent class model specification, higher income respondents exhibit higher willingness to pay values
for all programme attributes; however, lower income participants have higher willingness to work values for
certain new water sources. We found a shadow wage rate of labour that is between 15 and 55% of the market
wage rate.
1. Introduction
Globally, over 240 million people in low and middle-income
countries are infected with the disease schistosomiasis, with over 90%
of these infections occurring in sub-Saharan Africa (Sanya et al., 2017).
Infections, driven by poor water access and inadequate sanitary re-
sources, are particularly prevalent among children. The costs of the
disease include reduced physical and cognitive development in children
and long-term severe morbidity, exacerbating the poverty cycle. In low
and middle income countries (LMICs), environmental and public health
interventions often fail when communities do not see a need for in-
terventions, or do not perceive ownership over these interventions
(Sawyer et al., 1998). This situation can occur when communities are
not involved in the decision and planning process, the implementation
of interventions, and/or the ongoing maintenance of assets provided in
the intervention. Interventions which fail to reflect community pre-
ferences are unlikely to be effective in the long term. In the case of
schistosomiasis, such interventions need to break the cycle of re-in-
fection by improving access to water resources which are un-con-
taminated by the parasite responsible, and by reducing the rate at
which the parasite is re-introduced to the local environment through
investments in sanitary resources.
Economists routinely measure people's values for alternative
(public) health interventions using stated preference approaches, since
these are capable of reflecting both the direction of people's support for
alternatives, and how strongly they support or oppose these alternatives
(Soekhai et al., 2019). Moreover, stated preference methods allow for
monetary evaluation of the benefits and costs of alternative interven-
tions, so that cost-benefit analysis methods can be used to determine
socially preferred choices (Carolus et al., 2018; Hanley and Barbier,
2009; Johnston et al., 2017). Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE) are an
especially useful method in this regard, since they permit the researcher
to evaluate how individual policy “attributes” – such as which specific
interventions are employed to achieve a given objective – compare in
terms of people's Willingness to Pay, which allows the relative eco-
nomic value of alternative interventions to be established. Moreover,
how the benefits of a specific intervention are valued differently by
different groups of people (preference heterogeneity) can also be
quantified using this approach. Set against these advantages, DCE ap-
proaches have a number of limitations: value estimates are conditional
on the exact description of the choice alternatives offered to partici-
pants; stated choices may not always be a robust predictor of actual
choices dependent on how choices are elicited; and respondents beliefs
on the consequentiality of their responses may vary, causing changes in
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their responses (Johnston et al., 2017).
It is standard practice in the choice experiment literature to include
a monetary payment vehicle as an attribute, as this is how researchers
obtain estimates of willingness to pay for changes in non-monetary
attributes for use in cost-benefit analysis. However, a monetary pay-
ment vehicle may not be appropriate in communities with very low
levels of income, or where trading can be commonly done via barter. In
such settings, researchers have argued for the use of non-monetary
payment vehicles such as labour time, which yield an alternate measure
of how much of a particular numeraire people are willing to give up to
benefit from an improvement in some desired attribute such as a re-
duction in water pollution.
In the study reported in this paper, we administered a discrete
choice experiment using two payment vehicles within the same choice
set: a monthly monetary fee and a weekly labour contribution.1
Through our unique design, individuals needed to make trade-offs be-
tween what they say they can afford in terms of time and of money for
reductions in health risks in each choice scenario. We did this by ad-
ministering a DCE in Uganda to explore willingness to pay and will-
ingness to work for interventions that improve water access and reduce
respondents' risk of contracting Schistosoma mansoni, the parasite
causing intestinal schistosomiasis in these communities.2 We surveyed
respondents in rural Uganda and asked their preferences for community
interventions that improve water access and health education, thus
reducing risks of catching schistosomiasis. We included both labour and
money as payment vehicles for the interventions. By doing so, we be-
lieve that respondents will be more able to make choices over inter-
ventions through contributing a combination of both time and money.
Additionally, including labour as an attribute could lead to higher levels
of ownership over possible interventions, since individuals are com-
mitting their own time to help maintain the quality of risk-reducing
investments. The comparison of money and labour payment vehicles in
discrete choice experiments is not new (e.g. Gibson et al. (2016); Rai
and Scarborough, 2015); however, our study is novel in that both
payment types are included within each choice set within a public
health context. As far as we are aware, this has only been done in two
other studies (de Rezende et al., 2015; Rai and Scarborough, 2012),
both within ecological contexts.
The remainder of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature on stated preference studies which incorporate the use of
alternative payment vehicles. Section 3 describes the field setting and
Section 4 the experimental design and econometric framework.
Sections 5 presents the model results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Literature review: paying with time or paying with money?
This section explores literature that has employed stated preference
methodologies in LMICs (Low and Middle-Income Countries) using non-
monetary payment vehicles. First, it is important to note that responses
to stated preference studies are context dependent: how a respondent
answers a DCE will likely vary depending on whether they are being
asked about biodiversity conservation, transport investments or inter-
ventions targeted at human health. This context-dependence can be due
to varying degrees of participant knowledge about the issue(s) over
which choices are made (Needham et al., 2018) or different degrees of
salience to the respondent (Ghose and Lowengart, 2013). Our study
explicitly focused on a human health issue. While not all papers pre-
sented in this section are related to human health, they all explore the
use of non-monetary numeraires. They are thus relevant to the design of
our study, and to its contribution to the broader field of stated pre-
ference choice experiments.
Non-monetary payment vehicles have been used in both discrete
choice experiments (DCE) and contingent valuation (CV) studies in
LMICs. Eom et al. (2006) administered a contingent valuation study to
assess willingness to pay or work for water quality improvements to the
Man Kyoung River in Korea. They found that levels of willingness to
work greatly exceeded “equivalent” values of willingness to pay. These
findings are similar to Vásquez (2014) who administered a study on
willingness to pay or work for an improved water system in Guatemala.
Respondents received a CV choice card with either a monthly fee or a
labour contribution required for the improved service. They found that
age is the only individual characteristic that significantly affects will-
ingness to pay values, with older respondents less likely to vote in fa-
vour of projects that improve water quality. Larger households were
significantly more likely to vote in favour of a project, likely given that
larger households could distribute the labour hours across household
members. The shadow value of labour as implied by these trade-offs
was equal to 20% of the local wage.
We now turn our attention to the DCE literature. Abramson et al.
(2011) administered a DCE in Zambia on water quality and accessibility
to water resources. Each choice alternative was presented as either a
contribution of cash, of labour, or through a microfinance loan. They
found that respondents valued an hour of their time at approximately
85% less than the market hourly wage. The authors concluded that
significant advantages exist from asking respondents to contribute time
rather than money in the specific context of their paper. Several studies
in developing countries randomise respondents to receive choice cards
with either money or labour as the payment vehicle. Gibson et al.
(2016) administered a DCE on improved water quality access in Cam-
bodia. Water quality was described in terms of taste/appearance, life-
time cancer risk due to arsenic contamination, and a payment attribute.
Respondents were randomly assigned to receive choice cards where the
payment vehicle was labour hours per week or money per month. They
found the opportunity cost of time to be similar to the market wage rate
with little difference between marginal utility measured using money or
time. Their findings surprisingly suggested that there are few differ-
ences in using time or money in LMIC choice experiments; however,
this is not the conclusion found in many other studies.
Rai and Scarborough (2015) administer a DCE in Nepal regarding
forest management which also consisted of an experimental design with
either labour or money as the payment vehicle. However, instead of
randomly assigning respondents to one treatment, respondents were
asked whether they were willing to contribute money towards invasive
species eradication. For respondents who answered positively, they
received the monetary treatment while others received the labour
treatment. Only 35% of the sample participated in the monetary
treatment. They found that respondents with higher incomes were more
likely to select into the monetary treatment. Using the average wage
rate as the value for one day's contribution of labour, they found that
respondents are willing to pay more in the monetary treatment than in
the equivalent labour treatment.
In Rai et al. (2015) a DCE was administered to households in Nepal
for watershed management programs. For sampling, two adjacent
households were visited with one receiving a monetary treatment and
the adjacent household a labour treatment. They found that households
in the monetary treatment are willing to pay $31/year for new wa-
tershed management. Households in the labour treatment are willing to
work 12.5 days a year, which translates to $37/year using the market
wage rate. They estimated the shadow price of labour to be 85% of the
market wage rate. They suggested that the high unemployment rate in
Nepal is responsible for making the shadow wage much less than the
market wage.
As far as we are aware only two papers have included both time and
money as co-occurring attributes: Rai and Scarborough (2012) and de
Rezende et al. (2015). de Rezende et al. (2015) administered a DCE to
1 This project is funded by the Medical Research Council Global Challenges
Research Fund, reference number MR/P025447/1.
2 There are many types of Schistosoma spp. which cause schistosomiasis. This
study focused only on Schistosoma mansoni. Henceforth in this paper, “schis-
tosomiasis” means the disease caused by Schistosoma mansoni.
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evaluate the benefits of mangrove restoration programme in Brazil.
Despite using both time and money in the choice sets, they only esti-
mated willingness to pay. However, they found significant and negative
estimates for the marginal utility of time spent working. They found the
opportunity cost of labour to be between 26 and 52% of the average
local wage. One limitation of de Rezende et al. (2015) is the inclusion of
only two levels for the labour attribute: 4 h per week or zero hours. Rai
and Scarborough (2012) use both labour and time in their choice sets
for an invasive species mitigation programme. The limitation of this
study is that labour and work were presented as annual contributions.
For rural households in limited income countries, where income can
vary substantially across months/seasons, creating shorter time scales
for which to budget their income may be more appropriate. This study
did not present willingness to work from the results; however, they
estimated that the opportunity cost of labour contribution is 47% of
local wage.
3. Case study: schistosomiasis management in Uganda
According to the national Ugandan Health Survey, access to im-
proved water services in rural Uganda is poor, with 27% of respondents
stating they use an unsafe drinking source (Uganda Demographic and
Health Survey 2016, 2018). Improving water access, sanitation and
hygiene resources (WASH) is one of the United Nations sustainable
development goals. It is vital to understand community preferences for
improved WASH services in order to make policy recommendations
that are both effective, affordable and sustainable. Poor water access
and sanitation leads to increased levels of disease, ultimately affecting a
country's productivity and economic growth.
Schistosomiasis is particularly damaging to rural communities in
Uganda. Over 50% of the population is estimated to be at risk of con-
tracting S. mansoni, a vector borne parasite that infects humans through
direct contact with contaminated water through activities such as
bathing, swimming, fishing and washing clothes (Loewenberg, 2014).
Disease risk are highest for those who live along the shores of Lake
Victoria and Lake Albert (Tuhebwe et al., 2015). Schistosomiasis, col-
loquially known as bilharzia, is a debilitating disease. Early symptoms
include abdominal pain, malnutrition, anaemia and inflamed liver and
spleen (Grimes et al., 2014). While it is uncommonly fatal, it can cause
liver failure and kidney cancers and can lead to reduced cognitive
development, reduced work performance and a generally lower quality
of life (Secor, 2014).
Mass drug administration (MDA) of praziquantel has been the main
approach to tackling schistosomiasis for>10 years. However, the para-
site's complex life cycle allows for high reinfection rates. The parasite
infects humans when they come in contact with contaminated water. The
parasite reproduces in its human host and eggs are excreted in the faeces.
Even after an individual is treated with MDA, they are likely to continue
conducting high risk water contact behaviours as the lake is the most
available, and sometimes only, source of water and income. Poor access
to safe water and inadequate sanitation have led to sustained prevalence
of schistosomiasis among Ugandan rural residents. Improved water access
and sanitation interventions are therefore needed to mitigate the re-
infection and transmission rates of schistosomiasis.
4. Experimental design
This study was designed in collaboration with experts in disease
management, public health and community engagement in Scotland
and Uganda. Based on this, a draft questionnaire was piloted in our case
study villages in September 2018 and again in December 2018. Five
local research assistants were recruited to administer the main survey in
January–February 2019. The research team spent one week training the
research assistants in the survey methodology, interview techniques
and data imputation. Surveys were administered on tablets using
Sawtooth's Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) system
(Sawtooth, 2016).
4.1. Sampling strategy
Respondents were surveyed in three rural Villages in Uganda:
Bugoto, Musubi and Bwondha in Mayuge district where the disease is
endemic (Fig. 1). These villages all reside along the shores of Lake
Victoria and exhibit a high prevalence of schistosomiasis. We randomly
sampled households in this area by following a standard sampling in-
terval. We aimed to recruit 400 respondents, 60% from Bwondha, 30%
from Bugoto, and 10% from Musubi (based on population sizes in the
three villages). A sampling interval was calculated by dividing the total
number of households in each village, taken from the national census,
with the desired sample size of each village.
Fig. 1. Map of sample location sites.
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4.2. Survey design
The survey was divided into three sections. First respondents were
read aloud descriptions of the attributes and levels and were shown an
example choice card. The second section consisted of the DCE task.
Respondents were asked to complete five choice sets depicting possible
future interventions that would create new water sources, improve
water collection and increase health education.3 After the choice sets,
respondents answered socio-economic questions as well as questions on
water behaviours and practices and knowledge of schistosomiasis. The
attributes and levels used in the choice experiment are outlined in
Table 1. Visual images were used to represent each attribute level to
counter problems of low levels of literacy.
First, we included an attribute on water source. A new water source was
described as being either a tap with different daily allowances (for how
much water people could collect) or a filtration centre. We included a
second attribute on safe water access points, which were descripted as piers
built along the shore that would allow individuals to access lake water
without wading into the lake (thus limiting contact with the parasite). We
had a third attribute regarding an augmented education campaign. The levels
of the education campaign differed according to how the information would
be administered. This was either through murals, public radio announce-
ments or talks by local village health guides. Finally, choice sets included
two types of payment vehicles: monthly fees (in Ugandan shillings (UGX))
and weekly labour hours (per household).
Attributes and levels were described to respondents using images. The
choice card alternatives were presented to respondents using the visual
representations that were described to them in the first part of the survey. In
each choice set, the enumerator described each alternative aloud, while
showing the respondent the choice card alternatives. Fig. 2 shows an ex-
ample choice card. A D-efficient design was created in Ngene 1.2
(ChoiceMetrics, 2018). Restrictions were made such that only logical
combinations of attributes appeared, and that all alternatives required the
payment of either labour and/or money. D-efficient designs require prior
parameter values. Parameter values were assumed to be positive for all
three non-payment attributes and were updated after pilot data were col-
lected. Monthly fee and weekly labour were assumed to be negative and
also updated after the pilot dataset. Fifteen choice sets were grouped into
three blocks with respondents seeing five choice sets each. Each choice set
consisted of two intervention alternatives and a status quo statement that
read “I prefer none of these options”.
Following the DCE, respondents were asked several follow up questions.
In line with recent studies on incentive compatibility, we asked respondents
several questions on their belief regarding the consequentiality of the survey
on a 3-point Likert scale (Zawojska and Czajkowski, 2017)– see Table 2.
Statement 1 can be considered a policy consequentiality statement. Unlike
studies on policy consequentiality in high income countries (e.g. Herriges
et al., 2009; Zawojska et al., 2019), we find that almost all respondents
believed the survey was going to affect future interventions. Because we
asked respondents about labour and monetary contributions, we asked two
separate payment consequentiality statements related to beliefs about how
likely they would have to actually work and pay for interventions. Slightly
fewer respondents believed in the payment consequentiality statements;
however, 89–92% believed in the likelihood of the monetary and labour-
payment consequentiality. The high levels of payment and policy con-
sequentiality we saw is promising to improve incentive compatibility, such
that a respondents best strategy is to behave truthfully (Carson and Groves,
2007).
4.3. Econometric framework
We estimated a standard conditional logit model and a random
parameters model based on Lancaster's (1966) consumer choice theory
and McFadden's (1974) Random Utility Theory. In that case, utility for
alternative (i) for individual (n) is assumed to be:= +U Vni nini (1)
where Vni is the deterministic component, or indirect utility function,
and εni is the random unobservable error term. The probability that an
individual will choose alternative (i) over alternative (j) can be ex-
pressed as the probability that utility for (i) is larger than utility for (j)
and is expressed as:
= =P exp(V )exp(V )ni nij 1J nj (2)
The indirect utility function for a random parameters model, can be
expressed as:= + + +V x x None Z xni ni nik n nik ni n fee,i (3)
where xnik is a vector of k-attributes. βni is the sum of the population
Table 1
Attribute and level descriptions.
Attribute Description Coding
Water source 1. Tap with 2 jerry cans Dummy variables
2. Tap with 10 jerry cans
3. Lake water filtration site, water made safe for domestic chores and drinking
4. Lake water filtration site, water made safe for domestic chores but not drinking
5. No new water source
Water access 1. 2 new water access points Discrete
2. 4 new water access points
3. No new water access points
Education campaign 1. Mural sensitisation campaigns Dummy variables
2. Daily public radio campaigns
3. Monthly community village health team talks
4. No new education campaigns
Money
(UGX per month per household)
1. 1500 UGX/month Discrete
2. 3000 UGX/month
3. 6000 UGX/month
4. 0 UGX/month
Labour
(Hours per week per household)
1. 1 h/week Discrete
2. 3 h/week
3. 5 h/week
4. 0 h/week
3 This was part of a larger study that also administered five choice sets on
sanitation interventions. Respondents were randomised to see either the sani-
tation or water access choice sets first. The results exploring the differences
between the choice sets on sanitation versus water access are explored in
Meginnis et al. (2019).
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mean and ηn is the individual deviation (Hensher et al., 2005). None is
the alternative specific constant. Individual characteristics, Zn, can
enter the model by interacting them with an attribute in the model that
varies over choice. For our analysis, we interact individual character-
istics with the monthly monetary fee, xfee, i.4
5. Results
We surveyed 425 individuals in three villages in Uganda.
Proportional to population sizes, the smallest village, Musubi, re-
presents 10% of our sample, Bugoto 31% and the largest village,
Bwondha 59%. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the samples.
The mean daily income was 7703 UGX ($2.04); however, median
daily income was reported to be 4000 UGX ($1.06) with 14% of the
sample reporting 0 UGX daily income. The sample was approximately
evenly divided between male and female respondents. The majority of
Fig. 2. Example choice card.
Table 2
Consequentiality statements.
Question Percent stated “Likely”
1. How likely is it that the survey will be used to influence future interventions? 95.06
2. How likely do you think it is that you will actually have to pay for the interventions? 88.94
3. How likely do you think it is that you will actually have to work for the interventions? 91.53
Responses were on a 3-point Likert scale: Unlikely, Neither, Likely.
Between 12 and 14 individuals answered “I don't know” to these questions.
4 We interacted these individual characteristics with labour as a robustness
check with no improvement to the model and similar findings therefore have
excluded these results.
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the sample has less than primary education. The average household size
is 6.35, with an average of 3.7 children per household under 18 and 1.4
children under 5. This is slightly higher than the findings of a recent
household survey where the average household size in rural Uganda
was 4.8 (Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2016, 2018). In the
2018 Ugandan Statistics Report, the mean monthly wage for rural
employees was reported as 120,000UGX ($32.59). This translates to
roughly 3947UGX ($1.07) per day, which is half the mean that we re-
corded, but very similar to our median.
Selected individual-specific characteristics, outlined in Table 5,
were interacted with the monthly fee attribute. Many studies interact
individuals' characteristics with the alternative specific constant; how-
ever, as much of our sample never selected this alternative (72.4%), we
concluded that an interaction with the payment vehicle was more ap-
propriate. Two important variables were included relating to a re-
spondent's knowledge and exposure to S. mansoni. We asked re-
spondents in an open-ended question how schistosomiasis was
contracted. Slightly over half of respondents correctly mentioned that it
is through contact with lake water (55%). Many respondents incorrectly
mentioned schistosomiasis could be contracted through open defeca-
tion (25%) (which is how it is transmitted onwards but not contracted)
or walking barefoot (18%) (how a different parasite, Hookworm, is
contracted).5 We therefore choose to include a dummy variable for
knowledge of how schistosomiasis is contracted, which equals 1 if re-
spondents mentioned touching the lake water when asked about how
one gets infected. Table 4 further analyses respondents' knowledge of
how schistosomiasis is contracted by education level and occupation.6
Since schistosomiasis is spread through contact with contaminated
water, we also included a variable for respondents who mentioned
spending a significant amount of time spent in contact with con-
taminated water who are therefore at higher risk. Respondents were
asked about their last visit to a natural water source, in which 59% of
the sample responded they recently used the lake. Both men and
women, 64% and 53% respectively, mentioned the lake as their last
frequented natural water source. Of the respondents who mentioned the
lake as their last frequented water source, 75% spent over 15 min with
at least their hands or feet submerged. We therefore included a variable
that equals 1 if a respondent mentioned spending a long time sub-
merged in lake water (≥ 15 min), thus exposing themselves to a higher
level of risk of infection.
In developing countries, income is sometimes proxied for through
ownership of land, farm animals or technical equipment, etc. (e.g.
Chowdhury et al., 2010; Khanh and Andtran Vo, 2005). This is because
accounting for household income in monetary terms may not be ap-
propriate. Households in our sample have a range of occupations, e.g.
fisherman, farmers, local business people. We found no single metric
which could act as a proxy for income across the different household
types. After discussions with the Ugandan research team and focus
group data, we decided to directly ask households their average daily
income. However, we note that this may be an approximation and may
well vary seasonally. Daily income is included as a variable in our
model. It is common practice to normalise income in regression analysis
by taking the natural log. This caused a problem in our data as 14%
reported zero daily income, the natural log of which is undefined. An
approach in the literature to deal with extreme values of income is to
instead take the sine hyperbolic transformation (Burbidge et al., 1988).
By taking the sine hyperbolic transformation or reported daily mean
income in UGX, the minimum value in our sample is 0 and the max-
imum is 12.61.
We estimated conditional logit and random parameters model.
Similar to Rai and Scarborough (2012), in estimating the random
parameter models, monthly fee and weekly labour (and the interaction
terms with fee) are estimated as fixed parameters.7 All other variables
are assumed to be random with a normal distribution and 1000 random
Halton draws.8
Looking at the log-likelihood values in Table 6, we can safely reject
the conditional logit model in favour of the random parameters (RPL)
model and will thus only discuss the RPL model below. The RPL model
shows significant and positive marginal utility for all the new water
sources, except for non-potable water obtained from a filtration centre.
Respondents have positive marginal utility for all forms of information
provision. The alternative specific coefficient none was coded as 1 for
the status quo alternative. The coefficient is negative, signifying a
preference for any intervention over a do-nothing policy. Respondents
also prefer lower weekly labour contributions. The attribute monthly fee
is only significant when interacted with knowledge: those who have
more knowledge about schistosomiasis infection are price sensitive.9
The other interactions with personal characteristics (submerge, income,
gender) were insignificant. We will use the parameter values in the next
section to estimate willingness to pay and willingness to work.
Table 3
Summary of sampled households.
Variables Average
Female 0.47
Year of education
Less than primary 0.515
Primary 0.38
Ordinary secondary 0.08
Advanced secondary 0.0094
Tertiary 0.0024
Household size 6.35
Children under 18 3.67
Children under 5 1.36
Occupation
Fisherfolk 0.25
Farmer 0.44
Local business 0.17
Income 7703
Table 4
Number of individuals with knowledge of how schistosomiasis is contracted by
education and occupation.
Education level
Knowledge Less than
primary
Primary Ordinary
Secondary
Advanced
Secondary
Tertiary
No 95 82 11 3 1
Yes 124 81 27 1 0
Occupation
Knowledge Fisherfolk Farmer Local business
No 45 91 32
Yes 64 98 42
5 The parasite causing Schistosomiasis is transmitted through open defaeca-
tion; however, is not contracted by openly defecating.
6 We checked the correlation coefficients between knowledge and education
level as well as between knowledge and employment type and find no evidence
of correlation.
7 We estimated a model with fee as a random parameter, but it was insig-
nificant and thus was re-estimated as fixed.
8 All models were estimated in R using the gmnl package (Sarrias and
Daziano, 2017).
9 We have further explored this effect using a split-sample approach shown in
Appendix A.
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5.1. Estimation of willingness to pay/work
Due to the insignificant effect of price for respondents who did not
state that schistosomiasis is contracted through touching lake water
(knowledge = 0), we can only estimate WTP for respondents with this
knowledge, i.e. knowledge = 1.
Willingness to pay and willingness to work for random variables are
defined by:
= + × = + ×WWTP and WTk k k
fee
k
k k k
labour
k (4)
where σk is the estimated standard error and ϕk is a draw from the
standard normal distribution for each random attribute k. Using this
equation, we calculated both willingness to pay and work for all attri-
butes. We estimated confidence intervals using the delta method (Hole,
2007). These are outlined in Table 7.
First we look at willingness to pay. In terms of a new water source,
community members are willing to pay the most for a new tap with a 10
jerry can allowance, equating to around 24,980 UGX/month/household
($6.63). For a tap with a 2 jerry can allowance and lake filtration with
potable water, the willingness to pay per household is 14,110–14,558
UGX/month/household (~$3.80). There is a small WTP of 2552 UGX/
month/household ($0.68) for each additional landing site. Regarding
education, there is a preference for talks given by the village health
team, with WTP nearly double than that for a mural-based or public
radio-based education campaign.
In order to compare the WTP to WTW, we can monetise the WTW
hours by multiplying by the local wage rate. We used the median in-
come of our sample (4000 UGX/day/household), which closely mat-
ched the average wage rate in rural Uganda (Uganda Bureau of
Statistics, 2018). Assuming households work 10 h a day, the hourly
wage is estimated to be around 400 UGX. Under this assumption, and
multiplying the monthly WTW hours by the hourly wage, respondents
were willing to work more than they were willing to pay for all attri-
butes and levels.
However, households may be considering labour hours committed
to the interventions as either leisure or housework hours foregone, ra-
ther than valuing them at the market wage rate. Because we include
both monetary and labour payments in our choice sets, we can directly
calculate the opportunity cost of labour. Using the estimated WTP and
WTW we calculate such a shadow wage rate by:
Table 5
Model variables.
Variable name Description Average (over whole sample)
Knowledge about schistosomiasis = 1 If respondent mentioned ‘Touching lake water’ 0.55
Submerge ≥15 min = 1 if respondent spent > 15 min with hands or feet submerged 0.4
Income = sine hyperbolic transformation of income 8.42
Female = 1 if respondent was female 0.47
Table 6
CLM and RPL models.
CLM RPL
Coef. Coef. Sd. dev
(st. error) (st. error) (st. error)
Water source
Tap 2 jerry cans 1.00⁎⁎⁎ 1.527⁎⁎⁎ 0.956⁎⁎⁎
(0.143) (−0.22) (−0.255)
Tap 10 jerry cans 1.718⁎⁎⁎ 2.703⁎⁎⁎ 1.349⁎⁎⁎
(0.170) (−0.297) (−0.276)
Lake filtration- non-potable −0.361⁎⁎⁎ −0.869⁎⁎⁎ 2.106⁎⁎⁎
(0.152) (−0.303) (−0.392)
Lake filtration- potable 1.039⁎⁎⁎ 1.576⁎⁎⁎ 2.015⁎⁎⁎
(0.154) (−0.262) (−0.321)
Landing sites 0.194⁎⁎⁎ 0.276⁎⁎⁎ 0.199⁎⁎
(0.030) (−0.048) (−0.078)
Sensitise
Murals 0.333⁎⁎⁎ 0.655⁎⁎⁎ 0.017
(0.108) (−0.192) (−0.325)
Public radio 0.360⁎⁎⁎ 0.710⁎⁎⁎ 0.031
(0.102) (−0.161) (−0.312)
VHT talks 0.682⁎⁎⁎ 1.229⁎⁎⁎ 0.890⁎⁎⁎
(0.110) (−0.201) (−0.232)
None −0.071⁎ −1.288⁎⁎⁎ 2.435⁎⁎⁎
(0.040) (−0.384) (−0.267)
Monthly fee
(per 1000UGX per household)
−0.062⁎⁎⁎ −0.102
(0.018) (−0.068)
Weekly labour
(per household)
−0.304 −0.103⁎⁎⁎
(0.204) (−0.028)
Interactions with fee
Knowledge about schistosomiasis −0.057⁎⁎ −0.108⁎⁎⁎
(0.023) (−0.038)
Submerge ≥15 min 0.048⁎⁎ 0.057
(0.024) (−0.038)
Income 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (−0.006)
Female −0.068⁎⁎⁎ −0.064
(0.025) (−0.04)
Log-likelihood −1821.703 −1685.975
AIC 3673.41 3419.95
BIC 3774.81 3555.827
Number of individuals 425 425
Number of observations 6375 6375
Significance:
⁎⁎⁎ = p < .01.
⁎⁎ = p < .05.
⁎ = p < .1.
Table 7
Mean willingness to pay and work per household with confidence intervals (CI)
at 95% level.
WTPa
UGX/month
(CI)
WTW weekly
Hrs/week
(CI)
WTW
monthly
Hrs/week
(CI)
Water source
Tap 2 jerry cans 14,110.25 14.88 64.01
(14,100.31,14,120.17) (6.44,23.32)
Tap 10 jerry cans 24,975.16 26.35 113.3
(24,967.55,24,982.76) (11.93,40.75)
Lake filtration- non-
potable
−8026.18 −8.47 −36.41
(−8028.04,-8024.31) (−15.27,-1.67)
Lake filtration- potable 14,558.95 15.36 66.05
(14,553.78,14,564.12) (6.3,24.42)
Landing sites 2552.83 2.69 11.58
(2541.97,2563.68) (1.18,4.21)
Sensitise
Murals 6052.63 6.39 27.46
(6042.852,6062.399) (2.29,10.48)
Public radio 6555.61 6.92 29.74
(6542.461,6568.749) (2.5,11.33)
VHT talks 11,351.92 11.98 51.5
(11,346.04,11,357.80) (5.35,18.6)
None −11,896.76 −12.55 −53.97
(−11,903.23,-11,890.29) (−21.74,3.36)
a Note: Calculated only for respondents where knowledge = 1.
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= =WTP
WTW Hours
14,110 UGX/Month
64.01 /Month
220.43 (5)
The shadow wage rate is approximately 55% of the estimated wage
rate in rural Uganda. This finding is similar to Rai and Scarborough
(2012), who find that labour is valued 47% of the local wage. We see
how these results differ when we take a latent class approach.
5.2. Latent class model
As noted in the Introduction, one advantage of discrete choice
models is that preference heterogeneity within the sample can be in-
vestigated. One way of doing this is through latent class models. Here
we present such a model, which assumes that the probability an in-
dividual will select alternative (i) is conditional on being in class (s).10
In this model eq. (2) is altered to:
= =P exp(V )exp(V )ni s ni sj 1J nj s (6)
We estimate a multinomial logit model that uses covariates Zn to
predict class membership.
= =P expexp( Z )r ( Z )ns nsS ns1 s (7)
The latent class model allows for class membership to be predicted
by individual covariates. To do this, we included the selected variables
in Table as predictors of class membership. We first estimated the
model with the 5 attributes: the status quo, and four class membership
variables with one to five classes, and find the BIC is minimised at two
classes (BIC = 3461.1359).11 Interestingly, this 2-class model has a
large percentage of respondents (77%) in a class with insignificant
marginal utility for fee.12 We inspected this further and included an
additional variable in our model: Cognitive dissonance.13 Through
focus groups, community members often mentioned disliking pro-
grammes that were offered for free, as price is often interpreted as a
signal of quality. Our choice experiment included choice sets where
interventions were offered at either a zero money cost funded only
through weekly labour hours; or zero labour hours funded only through
monthly fees or a combination of money and labour, but none that were
completely free. Programmes which are provided at zero cost (either
monetary or labour) may be interpreted by respondents as (i) lower
quality or (ii) unrealistic in terms of financial support needed to be
successful. We therefore include a variable dis that equals 1 if an al-
ternative is not the status quo and is only funded through a payment of
money or labour (that is, where either labour hours = 0, or monthly
fee = 0). We then ran the model varying the number of classes from 1
to 5 and find the BIC is minimised in the 2-class model
(BIC = 3450.1109). Table 8 outlines the preferred model.
Surprisingly, none of our covariates are significant in predicting
class membership, except income, at the 10% confidence level.
Respondents with higher income are more likely to be in Class 1. The
variable dis is negative and significant in both classes, suggesting dislike
for options which are provided with either no monetary or no labour
payment. Our preferred model yields the expected negative (and sig-
nificant) marginal utility for both the fee and labour payment attri-
butes.
Class 1 respondents represents over 77% percent of the sample and
are more likely to be those with higher incomes. They have positive and
significant marginal utility for all new water sources, except for the
non-potable filtration centre. Respondents in Class 1 have significant
disutility for the status-quo option and positive marginal utility for all
education types, with the largest marginal utility for VHT talks.
On the other hand, respondents in Class 2, which make up over 22%
of the sample, are indifferent towards public health education messages
and even exhibit negative and significant marginal utility for education
delivered through murals. They receive positive marginal utility for
taps and the potable filtration centre, but negative marginal utility for
the non-potable filtration centre. Similar to Class 1, Class 2 exhibit
positive marginal utility for the landing sites but are indifferent to the
status quo. In order to explore these preferences further, we turn to
looking at willingness to work and willingness to pay.
5.3. Willingness to pay/work- Latent class model
Following the same process as the RPL model, we can calculate WTP
and WTW for each of the significant attributes for these two latent
classes of respondents (Table 9).
Respondents in Class 1 are willing to pay more for all new water
types than Class 2. The highest willingness to pay for Class 1 is for a tap
Table 8
Latent class model.
Class 1
(st. err)
Class 2
(st. err)
Water source
Tap 2 jerry cans 0.6945⁎⁎⁎ 2.4621⁎⁎⁎
(0.2086) (0.4977)
Tap 10 jerry cans 1.318⁎⁎⁎ 3.8772⁎⁎⁎
(0.2467) (0.5326)
Lake filtration - non-potable −0.4285⁎⁎ −1.0263⁎
(0.2173) (0.6201)
Lake filtration - potable 0.8547⁎⁎⁎ 1.4138⁎⁎⁎
(0.2347) (2.6793)
Landing sites 0.1574⁎⁎⁎ 0.2151⁎⁎⁎
(0.0412) (2.3736)
Sensitise
Murals 0.2595⁎ −0.6471⁎
(0.1449) (−1.6449)
Public radio 0.2869⁎⁎⁎ −0.1177
(0.141) (−0.3208)
VHT talks 0.7374⁎⁎⁎ −0.2434
(0.1507) (−0.6793)
None −2.6486⁎⁎⁎ −0.1366
(0.4764) (−0.18)
Fee (per 1000UGX) −0.0745⁎⁎⁎ −0.5786⁎⁎⁎
(0.0259) (−7.0064)
Labour −0.0743⁎⁎⁎ −0.1508⁎
(0.0215) (−1.8352)
Dis −0.3618⁎⁎⁎ −0.8608⁎⁎⁎
(0.1094) (−3.0785)
Latent class covariates
Intercept 0.304 −0.304
(0.218) (0.218)
Knowledge about schistosomiasis 0.0449 −0.0449
(0.1416) (0.1416)
Submerge ≥15 min 0.1991 −0.1991
(0.148) (0.148)
Female −0.1236 0.1236
(0.1495) (0.1495)
Income 0.0366⁎ −0.0366⁎
(0.0196) (0.0196)
Class share 0.7739 0.2261
Log-likelihood −1637.30
AIC 3332.60
BIC 3450.11
N 2125
⁎⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎⁎ p < .05.
⁎ p < .1.
10 See Greene and Hensher (2003) for a detailed explanation of Latent Class
Analysis.
11 All Latent Class Models were estimated using Latent Class Gold.
12 See Appendix B.
13 We would like to thank Michael Burton for his suggestion and the audience
of the Thematic Session at EAERE 2019 for their helpful comments.
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with 10 jerry cans, followed by a potable filtration centre. Class 2 re-
spondents are willing to pay the most for a tap with 10 jerry cans but
are willing to pay more for a tap with 2 jerry cans than a potable fil-
tration centre. Both classes are willing to pay a small amount for each
additional landing site. Class 1 respondents are willing to pay around
the same amount for education delivered through murals and public
radio, but their willingness to pay nearly doubles for health talks led by
the village health team.
Looking at respondent's willingness to work, Class 2 respondents are
willing to work more hours than Class 1 for their preferred new water
source. Recall that the only significant difference between Class 1 and
Class 2 was that respondents with higher incomes were more likely to
be in Class 1. Class 1 respondents are willing to pay more on average for
the different new water sources, but Class 2, are willing to work more
for new taps. Both classes are willing to work<10 h for new landing
sites and only Class 1 are willing to work for the education pro-
grammes.
We can calculate the shadow price of labour for both classes. Using
Eq. 5, we find that the opportunity cost of labour is 232 UGX/h/
household for Class 1 and 60 UGX/h/household for Class 2. The ma-
jority of respondents belong in Class 1, with an opportunity cost of
labour almost exactly that found from the RPL model. This shadow
wage rate represents slightly> 50% of the market wage rate. However,
22% of respondents belong to Class 2 which exhibit an opportunity cost
of labour that is 15% the market wage rate, suggesting a lower op-
portunity cost for one hour of work for these respondents.
6. Discussion and conclusions
This paper takes a novel approach to looking at non-monetary
payment vehicles in discrete choice experiments, in the context of
public health interventions in a low-income country. We administered a
DCE on respondent's willingness to pay and willingness to work for new
interventions which would improve community's water access and
implement health education programmes, reducing the risks to com-
munity members of (re-)contracting schistosomiasis. We included both
time and money payments as attributes in each choice set, something
we believe more accurately represents a community's sense of owner-
ship over different interventions and the feasibility of actually im-
plementing these projects. Including both types of payment vehicle
could improve a project's effectiveness and sustainability, since the life
cycle of a project from construction to usage and ongoing maintenance
would require inputs of both community time and money. Additionally,
including time and money more appropriately captures values for in-
dividuals, households or communities who may have more time than
money at their disposal, or vice versa.
In the RPL model, WTP can only be calculated for respondents
where knowledge = 1, i.e. where a respondent knows how schistoso-
miasis is transmitted. However, using the LCM approach, we find sig-
nificant marginal utility for fee in both classes, neither of which had
knowledge as a significant predictor of class membership. Our restric-
tion in the RPL model that knowledge impacts preferences towards the
monthly fee attribute is perhaps too restrictive, potentially since many
other infectious diseases can be contracted from unsafe water.
Furthermore, in the LCM we introduced the cognitive dissonance
variable dis, which accounted for all alternatives that required only
payments of time or only money. This variable is negative and sig-
nificant, suggesting a strong dislike for attributes provided free of la-
bour or free of charge.
In the LCM we find only two distinct classes of individuals.
Respondents show differing willingness to pay and willingness to work
for the set of interventions considered. Previous studies have used the
market wage rate as means of converting labour hours into numeric
figures which can then be used to compare to the willingness to pay
values. Using the market wage rate, we find higher levels of willingness
to contribute time than money. However, because our study includes
both time and money, we are able to directly calculate the shadow price
of labour and find it to be between 15 and 55% of the market wage rate.
This suggests that using the market wage rate is not an appropriate
means to translate labour hours into monetary values in these com-
munities. Nearly a quarter, 22%, of our sample have a shadow wage
rate equivalent to 15% of the market wage rate, suggesting a preference
for contributing time over money. Vásquez (2014) found a similar
shadow wage rate (20%) and concluded that respondents are re-
allocating housework time to the project, at a shadow value which is
lower than the market wage rate. Further research is needed to better
understand individuals' time constraints and whether they are re-
allocating time from paid labour, housework, daily chores, and/or lei-
sure to public health projects.
Among the set of interventions modelled, the highest WTP and
WTW values were found for the creation of new water sources. A jerry
can of safe drinking water from a tap currently costs around 1000 UGX
Table 9
WTP and WTW.
WTP
(UGX/month/household)
WTW
(hrs/week/household)
WTW
(hrs/month/household)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2
Water source
Tap 2 jerry cans 9327.5 4255.5 9.3 16.3 40.2 70.2
(1727.47609.4) (2494.64255.5) (1.9,16.7) (−4.4,37.0)
Tap 10 jerry cans 17,702.2 6701.4 17.7 25.7 76.2 110.6
(4616.613103.2) (4606.56701.4) (5.7,29.6) (−4.5,56.0)
Lake filtration - non-potable −5755.6 −1773.8 −5.8 −6.8 −24.8 −29.3
(−12,329.26567.8) (−3856.8,-1773.8) (−12.0,0.5) (−15.0,1.3)
Lake filtration - potable 11,479.8 2443.7 11.5 9.4 49.4 40.3
(1189.810301.4) (485.22443.7) (2.4,20.5) (−5.1,23.8)
Landing sites 2114 371.8 2.1 1.4 9.1 6.1
(330.41785.7) (34.6371.8) (0.7,3.4) (−0.5,3.3)
Sensitise
Murals 3485.9 −1118.5 3.5 −4.3 15.0 −18.5
(−1581.65071.1) (−2446.2,-1118.5) (−0.8,7.8) (−11.0,2.5)
Public radio 3854 – 3.9 – 16.6 −3.4
(−1365.15222.9) (−0.5,8.3)
VHT talks 9903.5 – 9.9 – 42.7 −6.9
(1207.18706.2) (2.8,17.0)
None −35,573.3 – −35.6 – −153.2 −3.9
(−61,404.725795.8) (−57.9,-13.2)
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($0.21) and only 8.7% of our sample said they currently collect water
from taps. Roughly 60% of our sample mention regularly using Lake
Victoria as a water source. This was evenly distributed among both
respondents who know and do not know how schistosomiasis is con-
tracted, with 58.7% and 54%, respectively. Therefore, even though
respondents are aware of the risks the lake poses, lack of suitable al-
ternatives lead to continued exposure to the parasite responsible for the
disease via lake water. Our results show high demand for new water
sources, with respondents willing to work and pay for these new water
sources. While public education was mentioned in many of our focus
groups as among the set of public health interventions with which re-
spondents had prior experience, the WTP/WTW for new education
campaigns included in our experimental design was relatively low,
except for specialist health person talks, which were highly valued by
Class 1 (77%) respondents. We introduced new lake access piers as an
intervention that would easily reduce exposure to schistosomiasis for
people collecting water from Lake Victoria. Respondents indicated a
WTP of between 370 and 2100 UGX/month/household for a new pier
or a WTW of between 1 and 2 h/week/household for this new resource.
Further research is needed to better understand respondents' atti-
tudes towards non-monetary payments in LMICs. For example, Gibson
et al. (2016) found evidence of attribute non-attendance for the pay-
ment vehicle in around 29% of respondents. Our variable dis captured
the effect of an alternative that was to be provided either at zero cost or
zero weekly labour. Respondents exhibit significant disutility for al-
ternatives which do not require both monetary and labour contribu-
tions. This is the first study that demonstrates this effect and further
research is needed to investigate the behavioural drivers of this pre-
ference.
We must be cautious of our interpretations, as some of the mean
household WTP and WTW values exceed the highest value used in the
experimental design. This may be due to our design levels being too
low, or to hypothetical bias. We also found very few respondents who
were selecting the status quo alternative, which may be due to attribute
non-attendance or interviewer bias, or a general dissatisfaction of the
current situation. One problem in administering DCEs in LMICs is the
need to use in-person enumerators, rather than anonymous web-based
surveying. Care was taken to train the enumerators to not steer re-
spondents, but interviewer biases may still have been occurring.
Finally, we note that participating in choice experiments requires
significant cognitive efforts on the part of respondents. By including
two payment vehicles, we have undoubtedly added an additional layer
of complexity. However, we argue that in subsistence countries, a
choice experiment with only a monetary payment vehicle is not ap-
propriate and can lead to un-helpful valuation estimates. Including only
labour or money as payment mechanisms limit respondent's investment
in the project. Indeed, we found that respondents actually prefer to
contribute both time and money towards the new programmes. Our
respondents appeared to fully understand the different choices being
offered within these DCEs despite this added complexity. These findings
support the notion that community participation is necessary
throughout the development stages of “one health” interventions in
order to deliver more efficient and sustainable outcomes.
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Appendix A
Table A.1
Knowledge = 0 Knowledge = 1
Coef. Sd. deviation Coef. Sd. deviation
(st. error) (st. error) (st. error) (st. error)
Water source
Tap 2 jerry cans 1.706⁎⁎⁎ 0.69 1.448⁎⁎⁎ 0.705⁎
(−0.371) (−0.583) (−0.269) (−0.353)
Tap 10 jerry cans 3.524⁎⁎⁎ 1.455⁎⁎ 2.190⁎⁎⁎ 1.083⁎⁎
(−0.56) (−0.517) (−0.34) (−0.33)
Lake filtration - non-potable −1.142⁎ 2.822⁎⁎⁎ −0.709⁎ 1.638⁎⁎⁎
(−0.576) (−0.738) (−0.349) (−0.476)
Lake filtration - potable 2.496⁎⁎⁎ 2.913⁎⁎⁎ 1.091⁎⁎⁎ 1.502⁎⁎⁎
(−0.533) (−0.642) (−0.298) (−0.367)
Landing sites 0.409⁎⁎⁎ 0.071 0.206⁎⁎⁎ 0.237⁎⁎
(−0.093) (−0.294) (−0.057) (−0.082)
Sensitise
Murals 0.957⁎⁎ 0.872 0.455⁎ 0.000
(−0.339) (−0.609) (−0.227) (−0.279)
Public radio 0.998⁎⁎⁎ 0.016 0.564⁎⁎ 0.015
(−0.294) (−0.583) (−0.19) (−0.382)
VHT talks 1.765⁎⁎⁎ 1.439⁎⁎⁎ 0.923⁎⁎⁎ 0.391
(−0.392) (−0.38) (−0.226) (−0.453)
None −0.301 1.982⁎⁎⁎ −1.791⁎⁎⁎
(−0.635) (−0.397) (−0.496)
Fee −0.184 −0.157
(−0.106) (−0.081)
Labour −0.185⁎⁎⁎ −0.05
(−0.052) (−0.032)
Interactions with fee
Submerge ≥15 min 0.153⁎ −0.02
(−0.064) (−0.048)
Income 0.008 0.003
(−0.01) (−0.007)
(continued on next page)
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Table A.1 (continued)
Knowledge = 0 Knowledge = 1
Coef. Sd. deviation Coef. Sd. deviation
(st. error) (st. error) (st. error) (st. error)
Gender −0.111 −0.029
(−0.067) (−0.05)
Log-likelihood −723.737 −945.235
AIC 1493.473 1936.471
BIC 1605.413 2052.862
Number of individuals 192 233
Number of observations 960 1165
⁎⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎⁎ p < .05.
⁎ p < .1.
Appendix B
Table B.1
Class 1
(st. err)
Class 2
(st. err)
Water source
Tap 2 jerry cans 0.74 2.47
(0.20) (0.49)
Tap 10 jerry cans 1.40 3.90
(0.24) (0.54)
Lake filtration - non-potable −0.25 −1.03
(0.21) (0.57)
Lake filtration - potable 1.09 1.72
(0.22) (0.51)
Landing sites 0.17 0.22
(0.04) (0.09)
Sensitise
Murals 0.52 −0.08
(0.12) (0.34)
Public radio 0.53 0.32
(0.12) (0.34)
VHT talks 0.99 0.12
(0.14) (0.35)
None −1.94 1.21
(0.43) (0.63)
Fee −0.02 −0.47
(0.02) (0.07)
Labour −0.06 −0.10
(0.02) (0.08)
Latent class covariates
Intercept 0.31 −0.31
(0.22) (0.22)
Knowledge about schistosomiasis 0.03 −0.03
(0.14) (0.14)
Submerge ≥15 min 0.20 −0.20
(0.15) (0.15)
Female −0.11 0.11
(0.15) (0.15)
Income 0.04 −0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
Class share 0.7756 0.2244
Log-likelihood −1648.86
AIC 3351.72
BIC 3461.13
N 2125
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